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Abstract 
Theoretically, it is posited that privatization enables the private sector to play a 
dominant role in the economy by enhancing competition, productivity and 
efficiency. When evaluated using these criteria, privatization of the manufacturing 
industries has failed in Ethiopia. Our empirical results show that, at best, 
privatization did not result in improving productivity, and at worst, it led to a 
decline in productivity. We argue that the main reason for this outcome is the 
unique economic and business environment prevailing in Ethiopia, which does not 
allow the standard economic assumptions of market competition to hold. Ethiopia’s 
‘private sector’ can be described as a ‘duopoly’ market where two powerful players 
dominate every sector of the economy: the ruling party’s parastatals and a family 
business conglomerate. The results of this paper should not be surprising as the 
majority of the firms in this study operate under such an unfavorable business 
environment. The paper employs 15 years of panel data constructed from the Large 
and Medium Scale Manufacturing Industries Surveys conducted by the Central 
Statistical Agency of Ethiopia between 1996 and 2010. 
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Introduction 
Between 1974 and 1991, Ethiopia was ruled by a socialist government operating under a 
strict centrally planned economy, with state owned and controlled manufacturing activities. It is 
argued that the socialist policies resulted in market rigidity and economic distortions leading to 
inefficiencies in every sector of the economy. The socialist economic policies, coupled with almost 
two decades of war, left the country in shambles. By the end of 1991, the country has a 
manufacturing industry dominated by inefficient state-owned enterprises, which were managed by 
loyalists instead of business minded professionals. Some of the enterprises owed their existence to 
their monopoly positions while others depended on the subsidies from the government (Asrat & 
Shiferaw, 2009). 
Under this economic background and upon the fall of the socialist regime, the current 
government, which took power in 1991, started implementing the Structural Adjustment Program 
(led by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund), whose core policy prescription was 
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privatization of state owned enterprises.  From the World Bank’s standpoint, privatization was part 
of an efficient and equitable economic growth that focuses on poverty reduction and protection of 
the environment. More specifically, the three main reasons for privatization are improving the use 
of public resources, operating efficiency and dynamic efficiency (Shirley, 1992). The World Bank 
set the Structural Adjustment Program, and hence privatization, as a key condition for extending 
loans to third world countries (Noorbakhsh & Paloni, 1999).  
Despite the World Bank’s conditions, different countries, however, were engaged in 
privatization for varying reasons. As stated in Proclamation No. 146/1998, the Ethiopian 
government identified the following three objectives of privatization: 1) generating revenue 
required for financing development activities to be undertaken by the government; 2) changing the 
role and participation of the government in the economy to enable it to exert more effort on 
activities requiring its attention; 3) promoting the country's economic development through 
encouraging the expansion of the private sector. Tadesse (1996) argues that the main motive for 
Ethiopia’s privatization seems to be generating revenue from the sale of the state enterprises, 
making the first objective the most important of the three.  
However, the government also decided to keep the majority of state owned enterprises 
while privatizing others of them. According to Proclamation No. 37/1996, areas of investment 
exclusively reserved for the state-owned enterprises include production and supply of electrical 
energy with installed capacity of above 25 megawatts, air transport services using aircraft with a 
seating capacity of more than 20 passengers or with a cargo capacity of more than 2,700 kg, rail 
transport services, and telecommunication and postal services with the exception of courier 
services. Although the government allowed for foreign investment, it was with some exclusions, 
barring foreigners from 19 areas of investment that were reserved only for domestic investors. 
Examples include: construction, tanning, radio/television broadcasting services, and commercial 
road transportation.  
The main objective of this paper is analyzing the level of productivity before and after 
privatization. This involves examining the impact of privatization on a firm’s level of employment, 
wages, resource utilization, and output using data from the Large and Medium Scale 
Manufacturing (LMSM) Industries Surveys conducted by the Central Statistical Agency (CSA) of 
Ethiopia from 1996 to 2010.  
 
The Economic and Business Environment in Ethiopia 
It is important to understand the economic and business environment under which 
privatized and state enterprises are operating in Ethiopia. The “private sector” in Ethiopia can be 
divided into three categories exhibiting complex relationships among each other. The first major 
category includes the business empires owned by the ruling party, the Tigrayan People's Liberation 
Front (TPLF), through the Endowment Fund for the Rehabilitation of Tigrai (EFFORT). It is very 
difficult to find the exact asset or net worth of the TPLF owned companies. However, Abegaz 
(2013) compiled data from different sources and reported that EFFORT had a seed capital of about 
$500 million dollars by mid 1990s, and about $1.25 billion dollars in 2013. The second category 
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includes an equally compelling conglomerate belonging to the Mohamed International 
Development Research Organization Companies (MIDROC), owned by the billionaire Sheikh 
Mohammed Al Amoudi, an investor with Saudi Arabian and Ethiopian heritage. These two groups 
seem to be operating like a ‘duopoly’ dominating every sector of the country’s economy. Finally, 
those newly privatized enterprises not owned by MIDROC or not affiliated with EFFORT 
companies fall under a third category which we call “the rest.” This third category has remained 
small and marginalized, operating in areas left out by the two major economic powers (Milkias, 
2003; Negash, 2008; Sutton & Kellow, 2010). 
EFFORT was formed, as soon as the current government came to power, by its leading 
party - the TPLF, using a seed capital generated by dissolving the nonmilitary assets acquired 
during their war effort and from other undisclosed sources (Vaughan & Gebremichael, 2011; 
Milkias, 2013). This made the ruling party the richest political party in Africa (Abegaz, 2013). 
According to Vaughan and Gebremichael (2011), the main objectives behind establishing 
EFFORT were promoting industrialization in Tigray and advancing the standard of living of the 
ethnic Tigrayan people (which constitutes about 6 percent of the Ethiopian population as of 2016). 
In addition, the TPLF allocated a portion of its funds to the other parties that constitute the ruling 
coalition to help them create their own endowment and party businesses. Under this arrangement, 
the Amhara National Democratic Movement’s (ANDM) endowment was named “Tirit” while the 
Oromo People’s Democratic Organization (OPDO) formed “Dinsho,” and the Southern Ethiopian 
People's Democratic Movement (SEPDM) set up “Wendo Trading” (Abegaz, 2013). These party 
businesses collectively operate on a smaller scale compared to EFFORT, which controls 70 percent 
of the current estimated net assets of $1.25 billion (Abegaz, 2013). 
These party parastatals are run by a ‘board of governors’ that is not only high-ranking 
leaders of their respective political parties, but also high-ranking government officials (Negash, 
2013; Vaughan & Gebremichael, 2011). The party owned businesses are involved in every sector 
of the economy. For example, the official EFFORT website lists companies operating under 
manufacturing, services, merchandise, construction, mining and agriculture (EFFORT, n.d.). It is 
also reported that these party parastatals receive preferential treatment (even more than those of 
state owned enterprises) when it comes to bank credits, access to foreign exchange, import/export 
licenses, government contracts or bids, tax treatments, and customs clearance to cite a few. The 
parastatals also work independently or jointly with other private domestic or foreign companies. 
In such instances, the preferential treatment extends to businesses operating as joint ventures with 
the party parastatals (Milkias, 2003; Plummer, 2012; U.S. Department of State, 2014).  
From the economy-wide point of view, Plummer (2012) reports on the level of corruption 
existing in health, education, water, land management, justice, telecommunications, and the 
mining sectors. In addition, Schwab and Sala-i-Martin (2015) identify corruption to be the fourth 
most problematic factor for doing business in Ethiopia, next to inefficient government 
bureaucracy, foreign currency regulations, and access to financing, in that order. Both studies raise 
serious concerns regarding the business environment in Ethiopia. GAN (2016) also provides 
summary information on Ethiopia’s corruption profile by listing the level of corruption in the 
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various government entities, including judicial, police, public service, land, tax and customs 
administration, public procurement and legislation. 
MIDROC Ethiopia Investment Group, founded in 1994, is the other powerful player in the 
Ethiopian economy. As of mid-2017, the Investment Group controlled about 80 groups and 
affiliate companies operating in agriculture and the agro-industry, construction, hotel and tourism, 
manufacturing, mining, oil and gas distribution, real estate development, transportation (including 
air transport), trade and commerce, healthcare, and education and training. All these companies 
are operating under two major groups, namely: MIDROC Ethiopia Investment Group and Affiliate 
Companies and MIDROC Ethiopia Technology Group Companies. In 2013, the total investment 
of all MIDROC companies was reported to be between $1 and $4 billion dollars (or between 2 and 
11 percent of Ethiopia’s GDP in 2013) (Negash, 2013; Sutton & Kellow, 2010).  
Data provided by the Ethiopian Privatization Agency (EPA) in the late 1990s revealed that 
the majority of the state-owned enterprises were sold to one buyer - the MIDROC Group. This 
information was later removed from the EPA website as the Ethiopian Privatization Agency (EPA) 
was recently merged with the Ministry of Public Enterprises to form the Privatization and Public 
Enterprises Supervising Agency (PPESA). As of the writing of this paper, no past data from the 
EPA about the privatized state-owned enterprises has been made available on PPESA’s website. 
By the turn of the century, the government had privatized 254 state owned enterprises. MIDROC 
alone purchased 21 of the 254 enterprises. Although these account for only 8.3 percent of the total 
number of privatized enterprises, they are comprised of enterprises with the most significant 
economic and strategic importance compared to all privatized enterprises since the start of the 
privatization process. In addition, they account for at least 60 percent of the market value of the 
enterprises privatized by the government up to that point. The trend of selling to a single buyer 
had not changed by the mid-2000s because a study conducted in 2005 confirms that out of 25 
enterprises privatized to foreigners, 23 were sold to one buyer (Hailu, 2005). In this regard, the 
privatization process has turned out to be a mere transfer of enterprises from state ownership to a 
single private ownership (wikiLeaks, 2008).  
The privatization process has also been rolling out very slowly in Ethiopia. After nearly a 
decade since the privatization process started, the state-owned enterprises were still the dominant 
forces of the economy. In 2004, state-owned enterprises accounted for 72% of the total 
manufacturing value added, 62 percent of the gross value of production, 57 percent of the 
manufacturing labor force, and 64 percent of wages and salaries (World Bank, 2004). 
In addition, even from the start, the privatization process was riddled with issues of 
corruption, forcing the government to halt the privatization process in the early 2000s. This event 
led to re-nationalization of some of the privatized companies. Examples of re-nationalized 
enterprises include a soap factory, a printing press, and a flour mill (USITC, 2004). Subsequently, 
the government resumed the privatization process under a new director. This incident was captured 
during the 15 years Large and Medium Scale Manufacturing (LMSM) Industries Survey data was 
employed in this study. As shown in Figure 1, the Ethiopian privatization process can be 
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characterized by two waves: the first wave of privatization peaked in 1996 before it slowed down 
in late the 1990s and early 2000s, and the second wave of privatization peaked again in 2007.   
Finally, the privatization process in Ethiopia seemed to suffer from a lack of transparency, 
as it was conducted clandestinely without involving stakeholders (Hailu, 2005). It was also not 
clear whether political decisions or economic conditions were dictating the privatization process 
that involved identifying the firms to be privatized, conducting market valuation of the firms, and 
determining the factors that govern the bidding processes.  
Given the privatization process outlined above, this paper attempts to study the impacts of 
privatization on the productivity of firms by using 15 years of LMSM industries survey data 
collected by the Central Statistical Agency (CSA) between 1996 and 2010. In addition, the paper 
makes comparisons of productivity differentials before and after privatization to investigate to 
what extent privatization has impacted the level of employment, wages, and resource utilization. 
 
Figure 1. Trend of privatization in LMSM industries (1994–2010) 
 
Our findings show that privatized firms exhibit no notable productivity (measured as firm 
output per employee) gains in absolute terms. In terms of marginal productivity gains resulting 
from the use of various factor inputs, we observe that privatized firms tend to exhibit no or small 
productivity differentials. However, the magnitude and statistical significance of these marginal 
productivity gains depend on the type of estimation method employed. The marginal gain in 
productivity estimated using the median absolute deviation (MAD) method is higher after 
privatization for the use of raw materials per employee, indirect inputs per employee, or the rise 
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in wage rates. In contrast, the marginal productivity gains resulting from using more capital per 
employee or employing more workers tend to be not statistically significant after privatization. 
It is also important to note that the level of employment, the use of indirect inputs, and 
wage rates are observed to decline after privatization. A small-scale study conducted by Wolde 
(2010) partly corroborates our findings. He surveyed six privatized firms and found mass layoffs 
after transfer of ownership. He also reported that the workers who became unemployed due to 
privatization did not receive any training for re-entry to the labor market or any other safety net 
services either from the government or the new owners.  
In summary, the economic and business environment in Ethiopia has not improved during 
the last 25 years as hoped by either the advocates of the Structural Adjustment Program of the 
early 1990s or the IMF and World Bank recommendations in recent years. Instead, the economy 
remains dominated by the ruling party-owned business empires acting as private corporations and 
competing for financial and other resources with the other equally powerful family conglomerate 
- the MIDROC Group. Our data do not specifically indicate who the new owner(s) of the privatized 
firms are. The data do not provide information on the dollar values of the state-owned enterprises 
upon privatization either. Nonetheless, based on the pattern and conditions of privatization 
discussed above, we assume that only a small fraction of the LMSM firms (but with significant 
economic and strategic importance) in our data are privatized to the MIDROC Group. This implies 
that the majority of the LMSM firms covered by this study are those privatized to other owners 
who are forced to operate under the unfavorable business environment described above.  
 
Model Specification and Estimation Methods 
Model Specification 
Firms are engaged in the process of transforming inputs into outputs via a certain 
production process (technology). This process is captured by the general functional form 
Equation 1:      𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝐴𝑖𝑡𝑓(𝑍𝑖𝑡)  
where 𝑌𝑖𝑡 is level of output and 𝑍𝑖𝑡 is vector of inputs used in the production process. 𝐴𝑖𝑡 denotes 
the total factor productivity (TFP) which captures all the factors other than the measurable inputs 
such as labor and capital (e.g., level of technology and externalities) which are designated in most 
studies as the major determinants of a firm’s productivity (Ozyurt, 2009; Soderbom & Teal, 2004) 
as well as a source of economic growth (Chen 2002; Krugman, 1994; Lucas, 2002).  
Equation 1 can be estimated using the standard Cobb-Douglas production function. Hence, 
firm 𝑖’s production at time 𝑡 is captured by: 
Equation 2:     𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝐾𝑖𝑡
𝛼(𝐴𝑖𝑡𝐿𝑖𝑡)
𝛽𝑒𝑢𝑖𝑡 
where 𝑌𝑖𝑡 and 𝐴𝑖𝑡 are as defined above, 𝐾𝑖𝑡 is the stock of physical capital, 𝐿𝑖𝑡 is ‘undifferentiated’ 
labor, and 𝑢𝑖𝑡 is the error term. The term ‘undifferentiated’ labor is used (in contrast to human 
capital augmented labor) to indicate labor with no education or experience (Hall & Jones, 1999). 
Since the Ethiopian LMSM industries surveys do not collect data on workers’ education and 
experience, we employ the standard production function expressed only by capital and labor 
inputs. 
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To calibrate the production function in Equation 2 for estimation purposes based on 
variables available in the Ethiopian LMSM industries data, we incorporate such factor inputs as 
raw materials, 𝑀𝑖𝑡 , and indirect inputs, 𝐼𝑖𝑡  (e.g., fuel and lubricating oil, electricity, water, and 
rented structures and equipment).  
Equation 3:      𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝐾𝑖𝑡
𝛼𝑀𝑖𝑡
𝛾 𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝜑(𝐴𝑖𝑡𝐿𝑖𝑡)
𝛽𝑒𝑢𝑖𝑡  
By linearizing, collecting constant terms and rearranging, we obtain the final estimation 
equation, 
Equation 4:     𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽𝑙𝑛𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼𝑙𝑛𝐾𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝑙𝑛𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝜑𝑙𝑛𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑙𝑛𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 
𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝐶 + 𝛼𝑙𝑛𝐾𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝑙𝑛𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝜑𝑙𝑛𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑙𝑛𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡   
where the constant term 𝐶 = 𝛽𝑙𝑛𝐴𝑖𝑡. In Equation 4, TFP (i.e., 𝐴𝑖𝑡) is considered a constant term 
since it governs the shift of the production function. Equation 4 is used to estimate the productivity 
of the Ethiopian LMSM industries in this study. This estimation equation quantifies the marginal 
contribution of each of the factor inputs to the productivity of state-owned and private firms. In 
other words, the estimation shows the percentage change in productivity (i.e., firm output per 
employee) in response to a one percent increase in each factor input.  
Estimation Methods 
As documented in many studies, several biases arise when a production function such as 
Equation 4 is estimated using the simple ordinary least squares (OLS) method. The biases may 
result from omitted variables, simultaneity, measurement error, and autocorrelation. To overcome 
such endogeneity problems, multiple estimation techniques have been proposed in the literature. 
Examples include the fixed effects (FE) estimator (Mundlak, 1961), instrumental variables (IV) 
(Angrist & Krueger, 2001), the semiparametric proxy estimator (Levinsohn & Petrin, 2003), 
structural identification (Ackerberg, Caves & Frazer, 2006), median absolute deviation (MAD) 
estimation (Buchinsky, 1998), and the generalized method of moments (GMM) panel data 
estimator (Arellano & Bond, 1991).  
Although there is no consensus in the literature regarding the successfulness of these 
methods in solving the endogeneity problems, we employ MAD and GMM estimations as the best 
alternatives for dynamic panel models. The MAD estimation (or median regression) has been 
proposed as an alternative to OLS estimation.  While the OLS method minimizes the sum of 
squared deviations from the mean, the MAD method minimizes the sum of absolute deviations 
from the median. As a measure immune to outliers, the latter estimation is expected to provide a 
robust estimation compared to the former which is highly sensitive to outliers. In addition, given 
the fact that the Ethiopian LMSM industries data are considerably affected by extreme values, the 
MAD estimation can serve as a plausible alternative to OLS estimation. 
On the other hand, GMM estimation is probably the most widely used method for dynamic 
panel models. However, the standard GMM (also known as difference GMM) estimators are found 
to suffer from weak instrument problem in dynamic panels with high autoregressive coefficient 
and small-time periods, T. Consequently, an extended version of the standard GMM (known as 
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system GMM) has been proposed to overcome the observed problems (Blundell & Bond, 1998; 
Griliches & Mairesse, 1995).    
The system GMM has also been employed as the best alternative estimator in recent studies 
(Blundell et al., 2001; Griffith et al., 2006; Levinsohn & Petrin, 2003 Wooldridge, 2001) in 
providing more reasonable results for dynamic panels with small T and large N (i.e., fewer time 
periods and many firms as in our case). These studies show that the system GMM improves the 
estimation results by adding extra moment conditions on the standard first-differenced GMM 
estimator as it uses the lagged differences of the endogenous variables as instruments. We employ 
the system GMM to exploit the additional efficiency gains from the extended GMM model and 
use it as a robustness check for the MAD estimation results. For comparison purposes, we present 
estimation results from all three estimation techniques (i.e., OLS, MAD and system GMM). 
Source of Data and Distribution of Firms in LMSM Industries 
Source of Data and Definition of Variables 
The data used in this study are drawn from the 1996–2010 Large and Medium Scale 
Manufacturing (LMSM) Industries Surveys conducted by the Central Statistical Agency (CSA) of 
Ethiopia.  CSA (2011) defines LMSM industries as establishments, both state and private, which 
engage ten persons and above and use power-driven machinery. Each year, the surveys cover 
establishments operating in all regions of the country under licenses issued by the Ministry of 
Trade and Industry and corresponding bureaus of the Regional States. CSA’s annual surveys 
gather basic quantitative and qualitative information relating to the structure and performance of 
the country’s LMSM industries.     
CSA surveyed a total of 4,303 manufacturing firms from 1996–2010 obtained after 
dropping those employing less than 10 workers (as per CSA’s definition of LMSM industries) as 
well as those reporting extremely small or no capital. These firms constitute an unbalanced panel 
data comprised of 160 firms that have been transferred from state to private ownership, 371 firms 
that have remained under state control, and 3,772 firms that have been privately owned since their 
commencement (Table 1).   
The variables used in the description of the distribution of manufacturing firms in Ethiopia 
and in the estimation of the production function are defined in Appendix A1. To make variables 
expressed in monetary terms comparable across time within the country and to those of other 
countries, we deflated and then converted them to an international dollar. We first deflated all 
values using their respective deflators, which were taken from the World Bank Report and 
computed using 2000 as a base year, and then expressed them in 2005 local currency units (LCU).  
While output and capital are deflated by the GDP deflator, the private consumption deflator was 
used for material inputs, indirect inputs and wages.   
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Table 1 
Distribution of Firms in LMSM Industries  
Type of Manufacturing 
Industry 
Privatized  
(1994 – 
2010) 
Not privatized  
Private since 
commencement 
Total 
% 
Privatized† 
Food products, beverages 
and tobacco 
71 44.4% 101 27.2% 916 24.3% 1,088 25.3% 41.3% 
Textile and wearing 
apparel, except fur 
24 15.0% 30 8.1% 161 4.3% 215 5.0% 44.4% 
Tanning and dressing of 
leather and foot wear 
10 6.3% 15 4.0% 215 5.7% 240 5.6% 40.0% 
Wood and paper, and wood 
and paper products 
4 2.5% 34 9.2% 108 2.9% 146 3.4% 10.5% 
Publishing and printing 
services 
3 1.9% 17 4.6% 146 3.9% 166 3.9% 15.0% 
Chemicals and chemical 
products 
13 8.1% 24 6.5% 135 3.6% 172 4.0% 35.1% 
Rubber and plastics 
products 
3 1.9% 17 4.6% 179 4.7% 199 4.6% 15.0% 
Other non-metallic mineral 
products 
15 9.4% 60 16.2% 870 23.1% 945 22.0% 20.0% 
Basic metals and fabricated 
metal products, except 
machinery and equipment 
5 3.1% 31 8.4% 316 8.4% 352 8.2% 13.9% 
Machinery and equipment 0 0% 1 0.3% 40 1.1% 41 1.0% 0% 
Batteries, motor vehicle 
bodies, parts and 
accessories 
1 0.6% 8 2.2% 55 1.5% 64 1.5% 11.1% 
Furniture 11 6.9% 33 8.9% 631 16.7% 675 15.7% 25.0% 
Total 160 100% 371 100% 3,772 100% 4,303 100% 30.1% 
Source: Authors’ estimations using panel data constructed from LMSM Industries Surveys: CSA 1996-2010. 
†Indicates the proportion of privatized firms out of the total firms which have been under state ownership.  
E.g., for the first industry: [71/(71+101)]*100% = 41.3%. 
 
Finally, all variables expressed in 2005 LCU were converted to their equivalent 2005 
international dollar values using the 2005 purchasing power parity (PPP) conversion factor for 
GDP, PPP conversion factor for private consumption, and market exchange rate ratio for wages. 
Appendix A2 shows the deflators and conversion factors used together with the list of variables 
on which they are applied. Note that henceforth all monetary values will be expressed in PPP 
adjusted 2005 international dollars (denoted as 2005 PPP $). An international dollar has the same 
purchasing power as the U.S. dollar has in the United States. 
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Distribution and Characteristics of Firms in LMSM Industries 
Table 1 shows the distribution of firms in LMSM industries in Ethiopia. The LMSM firms 
have been categorized into three groups in this study: privatized (i.e., those transferred from state 
to private ownership); not privatized (i.e., those who remained under state control); and private 
since commencement. The CSA surveys reveal that there are over four thousand LMSM firms 
operating in the country, and out of 531 LMSM firms that were under state control, about 30% 
(160) have been privatized in the span of seventeen years (1994–2010). A review of the percent of 
privatized firms (out of the total number of firms under state ownership and captured by the CSA 
survey) in Table 1 reveals that privatization seems to have focused primarily on four industries: 
textile and wearing apparel (44.4%), food, beverage and tobacco (41.3%), tanning and dressing of 
leather and foot wear (40%), and chemicals and chemical products (35.1%). In the remaining 
industries, the government has privatized a relatively small number of firms compared to the total 
number of firms remaining under its control. 
 
Table 2 
Number of Privatized Firms by Year of Transfer  
Sources: Authors’ estimations using panel data constructed from LMSM Industries Surveys: CSA 1996-
2010. 
† The surveys captured no privatized machinery and equipment industry, if any (see Table 1). 
Table 2 exhibits the years in which privatization has taken place in various LMSM 
industries. The privatization episodes seem to have taken place in two waves. The first wave of 
privatization took place from 1996 to 2000 and the second from 2005 to 2009. In both waves, a 
Type of Manufacturing Industry† 
1994-
1995 
1996-
2000 
2001-
2004 
2005-
2010 
Total % 
Food products, beverages and tobacco 7 31 11 22 71 44.4 
Textile and wearing apparel, except fur 0 7 0 17 24 15.0 
Tanning and dressing of leather and foot 
wear 
0 3 1 6 10 6.3 
Wood and paper, and wood and paper 
products 
0 1 1 2 4 2.5 
Publishing and printing services 0 3 0 0 3 1.9 
Chemicals and chemical products 1 5 0 7 13 8.1 
Rubber and plastics products 0 1 1 1 3 1.9 
Other non-metallic mineral products 0 1 3 11 15 9.4 
Basic metals and fabricated metal products, 
except machinery and equipment 
0 2 0 3 5 3.1 
Batteries, motor vehicle bodies, parts and 
accessories 
0 0 0 1 1 0.6 
Furniture 3 8 0 0 11 6.9 
Total 11 62 17 70 160 100 
% 6.9 38.8 10.6 43.8 100  
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total of 130 (81.3%) firms were privatized, representing 62 (38.8%) and 68 (42.5%) firms in the 
first and second waves of privatization respectively. As indicated above, issues primarily related 
to corruption might have caused the slowdown in the privatization process in the early 2000s, 
which forced the government to assign a new director to the EPA and re-nationalize some of the 
privatized firms (WikiLeaks). 
The CSA surveys do not provide information on the factors driving the privatization 
process, nor do they outline the criteria the government is using when privatizing firms in the 
LMSM industries. However, the surveys gather information on the performances of both state and 
privately-owned firms. The surveyed firms reported on their rates of production and possible 
reasons for underutilization of their resources. Table 3 summarizes this information.  
 
Table 3 
Mean Rates of Capacity Utilization and Reasons for Underutilization  
 
 
Output as % 
of production 
at full-
capacity 
Three top reasons for capacity underutilization (% of firms) 
Type of firm 
1 
Shortage of raw 
materials, spare 
parts and 
working capital 
2 
Difficulty in 
market 
competition and 
lack of market 
demand 
3 
Government 
rules and 
regulations 
Number 
of firms 
Number of 
observations 
Privatized 
59.9 61.4 36.1 33.4 160 767 
(28.5) (48.7) (48.1) (47.2)   
Not privatized 
(stay state 
owned) 
62.1 64.5 35.3 27.3 371 1,748 
(37.3) (47.9) (47.8) (44.6)   
Private since 
Commencement 
58.1 64.2 42.5 43.0 3,772 10,422 
(59.6) (47.9) (49.4) (49.5)   
Weighted mean† 58.8  64.1 41.1  40.3 4,303 12,937 
Sources: Authors’ estimations using panel data constructed from LMSM Industries surveys: CSA 1996-
2010. 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. 
†The level of production and the three reasons are weighted by the number of observations. 
 
Overall, the country’s LMSM firms were able to realize slightly higher than half (58.8%) 
of their full-capacity production. Nearly two-third of these firms reported a ‘shortage of raw 
materials, spare parts and working capital’ as the first major reason for their capacity 
underutilization. About 40 percent of the firms also identified ‘market related factors’ and 
‘government rules and regulations,’ as the second and third top reasons for operating under-
capacity. On the other hand, it is the private firms (both the newly privatized firms (33.4%) and 
firms that have been private since commencement (43.0%)) that were most dominantly affected 
by government rules and regulations compared to the state-owned enterprises. This is reflective of 
the double standard business environment prevailing in Ethiopia, which is described by Mikias 
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(2003) as an environment riddled with preferential treatment, favoritism, kickbacks and 
connections with the ruling party officials or their business conglomerates. 
In addition, the problem of under-capacity production is relatively higher in the private than 
state owned manufacturing firms, as private firms are producing at rates 2 to 4 percentage points 
lower than state-owned firms. Comparisons among the privately-owned firms reveal that the newly 
privatized firms have had marginally better performance records than the firms that have been 
private since commencement. 
 
Estimation of Productivity in LMSM Industries 
To capture the impacts of privatization properly, we estimated and compared the 
productivities of the newly privatized firms before and after they had been privatized. For such 
analyses, we further subdivided the 160 privatized firms into two groups: those that had been 
surveyed both before and after privatization (68) and those surveyed only after they have been 
privatized (92) (Table 4). The firms in the first group provided additional information on how they 
were performing while under state control. In contrast, as the CSA surveys fails to capture the 
firms in the second group prior to being privatized, we only know their performance after they 
have been privatized. As a result, no separate analysis is conducted for firms in this group. Hence, 
emphasizing only on the 68 firms with before-and-after privatization data, we were able to estimate 
their productivity differentials and present the results. We believe that the number of privatized 
firms (with the combined panel data of 392 observations) is large enough to enable us to generate 
valid statistical estimates and make inferences on the impacts of privatization on the performances 
of Ethiopia’s LMSM industries. 
 
Descriptive Statistics of Estimation Variables 
Table 4 presents descriptive statistics of the variables used for estimation of productivity 
differentials. Comparisons of the means and medians of the variables in each group reveal that 
each variable is highly skewed to the right. Such skewed distribution in the data indicates that all 
the estimation variables exhibit very high extreme values that affect the mean values, confirming 
that the median values may be the best measures in such cases.  
Comparing the changes in the use of factor inputs before and after privatization, we observe 
that despite employing more capital, raw material and indirect inputs per employee after 
privatization, the firms do not seem to register a significant increase in productivity. In particular, 
notice that the firms are investing substantially more amounts of money on capital, by a mean 
difference of 18,580 or a median difference of 14,800 (2005 PPP $) per employee per year, after 
they have been privatized. Nevertheless, output per employee either has remained nearly the same 
or showed a slight decline. On the other hand, the median wage has significantly declined after 
privatization by 220 (2005 PPP $) per employee per year. In addition, the most characteristic 
feature of the privatized firms is a substantial reduction observed in the level of employment after 
privatization.  
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Table 4 
Descriptive Statistics - Privatized Firms Surveyed Before vs. After Privatization 
Sources: Authors’ estimations using panel data constructed from LMSM Industries Surveys: CSA 
1996-2010. 
†t-test for difference in means between privatized firms (after privatization minus before privatization). 
††Non-parametric test for difference in medians between privatized firms (after privatization minus before 
privatization). 
†††Out of the 160 privatized firms only 68 firms have been surveyed both before and after they were 
privatized. 
Notes: Differences are significant at *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 The monetary values are in '000 of 
PPP adjusted 2005 international dollar. Numbers in parentheses are linearized standard errors. 
 
Productivity Estimations  
We have presented the productivity estimations for the privatized firms from the three 
estimation methods (i.e., OLS, MAD and system GMM). In all cases, the dependent variable has 
been log productivity (i.e., log of firm output per employee), and the independent variables are 
expressed in log, with the exception of the variable that captures the level of labor employment in 
these firms. As a result, the coefficients of the estimated variables (except for the level of 
employment) have been interpreted as percentage contributions to productivity. 
Table 5 exhibits the productivity estimates of privatized firms when they were under state 
control and after they have become privatized. Despite the substantial increase observed in the use 
of capital per employee after privatization (Table 4), firms have not yet been able to attain 
significant marginal gains in productivity. This implies that privatized firms are still capital-starved 
Variables 
Before privatization After privatization 
Difference 
 in mean† 
Difference 
in 
median†† 
Mean Median Mean Median 
Output per employee 56.27 
(7.969) 
39.76 57.60 35.81 1.33 -3.95 
(7.095) (7.88)  
Capital per employee 16.70 6.59 35.28 21.38 18.58*** 14.80*** 
(3.572) (5.322) (6.10)  
Raw materials per 
employee 
 
24.23 11.13 25.56 12.57 1.33 1.44 
(4.602) (5.649) (6.60) 
 
Indirect inputs per 
employee 
 
2.08 1.17 2.94 1.05 0.86* -0.12 
(0.332) (0.551) (0.48) 
 
Wage per employee 
 
2.05 1.96 1.98 1.73 -0.07 -0.22*** 
(0.087) (0.115) (0.12)  
Employment  363.6 212 277.0 145 -86.6** -67*** 
 (49.74)  (39.68)  (38.37)  
Number of firms††† 68 68   
Number observations 501 392   
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and could significantly boost productivity by increasing the level of their use of capital per 
employee. 
Before privatization, the level of employment contributed negatively to productivity. This 
may be due to the inherent tendency of state owned firms to over-employ. This inefficiency has 
been corrected after privatization probably by laying off redundant workers as described in Hailu 
(2005) and Wolde (2010) where mass layoffs are characteristic of privatized firms in Ethiopia. It 
should be noted that over-employment in state owned firms is not unique to Ethiopia, as most 
state-owned firms have a tendency to over-employ (Celasun, 2013; Oberhofer, Cuaresma & 
Vincelette, 2012; Forster & Briceno-Garmendia, 2010). For instance, Crespo et al. (2012) identify 
labor hoarding as one of the causes for inefficiencies and productivity differentials in state-owned 
firms compared to the corresponding private firms in the Belarusian machine building industries.  
Raw materials and indirect inputs contribute positively and significantly to productivity 
both before and after privatization. For instance, privatized firms could boost productivity by 
approximately 0.5 percent and 0.2 percent, respectively, by increasing the level of use of raw 
materials and indirect inputs per employee just by one percentage point. This partly compares to 
Arnold et al. (2008) who find consistently positive and significant relationships between such 
service inputs as communication, electricity and financial services and firm productivity in over 
1,000 firms in ten Sub-Saharan African countries.  
For the case at hand, while the percentage contribution of raw materials per employee is 
lower after privatization, that of indirect inputs per employee is higher after privatization. The 
latter may have resulted from the slight reduction observed in the level of indirect input utilization 
(Table 4). In contrast, the decline in the marginal contribution of raw materials to productivity may 
have been caused by diminishing marginal productivity resulting from the increased use of raw 
materials after privatization compared to before privatization (Table 4).  
The positive and significant economic contribution of wage per employee observed before 
the firms were privatized seems to have been neutralized when the firms became privatized, with 
the exception of the MAD estimation where it remains positive and highly significant. This is in 
line with the significantly lower wage paid to employees after the firms have become privatized, 
as captured by the significant difference in median wage in Table 4. 
Overall, it can be concluded that over-employment was prevalent in the LMSM firms prior 
to privatization triggering the condition for the significant reduction observed in productivity. 
However, the reduction in the labor force (in search of efficiency) after privatization did not result 
in higher productivity.  
In summary, the results from our descriptive statistics reveal that productivity did not 
improve (it rather slightly declined) after privatization. The significant changes resulting from 
privatization were increase in capital per employee, and decline in wage per employee and the 
level of employment. The results from our estimations show that productivity could be improved 
in privatized firms by increasing the level of raw materials, indirect inputs and wage per employee.  
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Table 5 
Estimations of Production Functions – Performance of Privatized Firms Surveyed Before vs. 
After Privatization 
(Variables in log) 
Before privatization After privatization 
OLS MAD GMM OLS MAD GMM 
Capital per employee 
 
0.00958 -0.000525 -0.000271 0.0801* 0.0296 0.0712 
(0.0321) (0.0137) (0.0430) (0.0459) (0.0250) (0.0460) 
Raw materials per 
employee 
 
0.619*** 0.631*** 0.641*** 0.495*** 0.587*** 0.526*** 
(0.0482) (0.0162) (0.0560) (0.0609) (0.0243) (0.0658) 
Indirect inputs per 
employee 
 
0.215*** 0.207*** 0.168*** 0.253*** 0.244*** 0.234*** 
(0.0354) (0.0165) (0.0479) (0.0521) (0.0214) (0.0522) 
Wage per employee 
 
0.310*** 0.271*** 0.199*** 0.00191 0.132*** 0.00347 
(0.0799) (0.0441) (0.0583) (0.0951) (0.0420) (0.0911) 
Employment 
 
-0.0888** -0.0974*** -0.0934** 0.00486 0.000374 0.00225 
(0.0362) (0.0195) (0.0419) (0.0519) (0.0273) (0.0466) 
Constant 
2.262*** 2.315*** 2.328*** 2.025*** 1.894*** 1.997*** 
(0.265) (0.124) (0.303) (0.336) (0.185) (0.295) 
R-squared 0.852 0.655 - 0.643 0.505 - 
Number of observations 486 486 486 369 369 369 
Number of firms 68 68 
Dependent variable: Output (value of production) per employee (in log) 
Sources: All estimations using the panel data from Ethiopian LMSM Industries Surveys: CSA 1996-
2010. 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses,    Significant at *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Discussion of Results 
Starting from the early 1990s, Ethiopia, like many African countries, embarked on 
economic reforms prescribed by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund as 
conditions to continued economic assistance. One part of the reform prescription was privatization 
of state owned enterprises that were theoretically deemed inefficient and ineffective to bring about 
sustainable economic growth. The underlying assertion has been that when such firms are 
privatized, the economic incentives and profit motivation prevailing in the market economy can 
promote productivity and fuel the engine of economic growth. However, as shown above, 
privatization failed to produce substantial improvement in productivity in Ethiopia.  
This goes contrary to most findings that document productivity improvements after 
privatization (Arnold et al., 2008; Brown et al., 2010; Chenm, 1997; Oberhofer et al., 2012; 
Noorbakhsh & Paloni, 1999). The above theoretical predictions of economic theory and empirical 
findings hold only under the core principles of competition governed by market forces and fair 
business environment (Hall & Jones, 1999; Megginson & Netter, 2001; Shirley, 1992). Therefore, 
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as a possible explanation for what went wrong in the case of Ethiopia, we looked at the prevailing 
market structure and business environment.  
The business environment in Ethiopia does not seem to encompass the basic economic 
conditions postulated by economic theory as necessary for free market competition, which 
probably is the main factor impeding the success of privatized firms (Abegaz, 2013; Milkias, 2003; 
Negash, 2013; Schwab & Sala-i-Martin, 2015; Vaughan & Gebremichael, 2011). For example, 
Schwab and Sala-i-Martin (2015) rank Ethiopia as 130th of 144 countries on the overall Global 
Competitiveness Index (GCI). GCI is a comprehensive tool that measures the microeconomic and 
macroeconomic foundations of national competitiveness based on a weighted average of many 
different components grouped into 12 pillars of competitiveness, including, for instance, 
institutions, infrastructure, labor market efficiency, financial market development, market size, 
and business sophistication.  
Ethiopia’s market distortions and lack of competition seem to mainly arise from 
intervention of the government in the market. Leaders of the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front 
(TPLF)-led government, who has been ruling the country for the last 25 years, started directly 
engaging in the market by creating vast “private” business conglomerates under the name of 
EFFORT. These business conglomerates are owned by TPLF and run by the elites in the party. On 
the other hand, state owned enterprises with high monetary and economic significance (but small 
in number) have been selectively privatized to one private company - MIDROC Ethiopia 
Investment Group. Such transfer of firms with high monetary value and economic significance to 
a single company amounts to a change in hands from one owner (the government of Ethiopia) to 
another (the MIDROC Group) in the name of privatization.  
The two groups (EFFORT and MIDROC) have become powerful market players 
blanketing every single economic activity in the country, and creating what looks like a “duopoly” 
market structure. This limits the market landscape on which the rest of private businesses, which 
are substantially smaller in size and larger in number but with insignificant market shares, would 
be operating. Under this environment, it would then be hard to expect the predictions of theoretical 
economic models, which are based on competitive market conditions, to hold. The business 
environment in Ethiopia is rather predestined to create a market distortion that encourages rent-
seeking behavior, political connections and preferential treatment, instead of furnishing the 
incentives for innovation or maximization of efficiency. Under these conditions, it should not be 
a surprise that productivity has either declined or at best showed no improvement after 
privatization for the majority of Ethiopia’s LMSM firms.     
 
Conclusion 
In this paper, we analyzed the impacts of privatization on manufacturing firms’ 
productivity, level of employment, wages, and resource utilization using 15 years of survey data 
on Ethiopia’s Large and Medium Scale Manufacturing (LMSM) industries, that was gathered by 
the Central Statistical Agency (CSA) between 1996 and 2010. We identified 68 privatized firms 
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(constituting 392 total observations) with data capturing their performances before and after 
privatization.  
Our findings show that privatization in Ethiopia seems to be ineffective as we were unable 
to find notable productivity (measured as firm output per employee) gains resulting from 
privatization. More specifically, while the mean difference in productivity shows a small and 
insignificant increase after privatization, the median difference in productivity shows slightly 
higher but insignificant decline after privatization. In terms of marginal analysis, we have observed 
that privatized firms tend to exhibit no or a small productivity differential (i.e., marginal gains in 
productivity) with respect to the majority of estimation variables.  
As the estimation results show, the marginal gains in productivity resulting from additional 
units of raw materials and wages have been lower after privatization. In addition, employing more 
workers does not have significant impact on productivity after privatization. Based on these results, 
it may be possible to conclude that privatization does not seem to help the country expand the use 
of its local resources to enhance productivity, or generate job opportunities for the workforce, in 
the manufacturing sector. Neither can the workforce in the manufacturing sector be able to receive 
higher wages because a rise in wage rates provides less marginal return to the owners of the 
privatized firms.   
Finally, we conclude with the following remarks regarding the economic and business 
environment in Ethiopia. First, the privatization process in Ethiopia seems to suffer from a lack of 
transparency, and is very slow and riddled with corruption. It is difficult to tell whether political 
decisions or economic factors are dictating which firms to privatize, how and by whom their 
market values are evaluated, and what factors govern the bidding processes, and when and to 
whom to privatize. Second, privatization does not seem to have achieved at least two of the 
objectives stated in Proclamation No. 146/1998: reducing government involvement in the 
economy and expanding the private sector. The creation of political party parastatals under 
EFFORT (and to some extent under Tirit, Dinsho and Wendo Trading), which are led by their 
respective party and government officials, has created an entirely new kind of participation and 
intervention of the government in the economy. The party parastatals and MIDROC Group are 
reported to have heavily dominated the various sectors of the economy leaving no or little space 
for the rest of the private sector to operate. State owned enterprises are still one of the major players 
in the manufacturing sector (besides EFFORT and MIDROC), further limiting the level of fair 
competition that enhances private sector development. 
This study identifies the market structure and business environment prevailing in Ethiopia 
as the most probable factors for achieving no notable productivity gains from privatization. This 
conclusion is derived from the survey of literature on market structure and business environment 
in Ethiopia as well as the responses from a large number of surveyed firms (both private and state 
owned) that identified these factors as the dominant cause for their under-capacity utilization of 
resources.  
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Appendix A1: Definition of Variables 
Variable Definition 
Output (Y) Total sales value + difference in inventory of semi and 
finished goods (end minus beginning period) + difference 
in inventory of raw materials (end minus beginning 
period). 
Capital (K) Total book value of fixed assets at the end of the year. 
Employment (L) Total number of permanent employees (administrative and 
production workers) in a year. 
Indirect inputs (I) Value of fuel and lubricating oil + value of electricity + 
value of water consumed + rental values for structures and 
equipment (in a year). 
Raw materials (M) Total value of raw materials consumed (local and 
imported) in a year. 
Wages (W) Total wages   (annual) 
Output per employee (Y/L) Output divided by number of employees, gives the dollar 
value of output produced by a worker per year. 
Capital per employee (K/L) Capital divided by number of employees, captures the size 
of capital available per worker per year. 
Indirect inputs per employee 
(I/L) 
Indirect inputs divided by number of employees, captures 
the size of indirect inputs a worker can use per year. 
Raw materials per employee 
(M/L) 
Raw materials divided by number of employees, captures 
the size of raw materials at the disposal of a worker per 
year. 
Wage per employee (W/L) Wages divided by number of employees, captures the 
dollar amount a worker receives per year. 
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Appendix A2: Deflators and Conversion Factors  
Deflators/Conversion factors 2003 2004 2005 
Variables 
deflated or 
converted 
GDP deflator  102.43 106.44 116.95 Y, K 
Private consumption deflator (or CPI)  101.18 109.90 117.42 M, I, W 
Market exchange rate (Birr per US$, 
period average)  
8.60 8.64 8.67 - 
PPP conversion factor for GDP 2.10 2.12 2.25 Y, K 
PPP conversion factor for private 
consumption 
2.53 2.55 2.75 M, I 
Market exchange rate ratio 0.24 0.25 0.26 W 
Source: The World Bank, International Comparison Program database, 2000 – 2005.  
Notes:  The PPP conversion factor is the number of LCU (Ethiopian Birr) required to buy the 
same amounts of goods and services in the domestic market as a U.S. dollar would buy in the 
United States.  
The PPP conversion factor for private consumption (i.e., household final consumption 
expenditure) is the expenditure in LCU (Ethiopian Birr) per international $. 
The market exchange rate ratio (or the national price level) is obtained by dividing the PPP 
conversion factor for GDP by the official market exchange rate.  
 
  
